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Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp.: The Ninth
Circuit’s Misdirected Interpretation of the Credit
Repair Organizations Act
I. INTRODUCTION
In Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp.1 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether the
Credit Repair Organizations Act (“CROA”)2 permitted the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement in a credit-repair contract.3
The Ninth Circuit glibly announced that the issue in the case was as
simple as making a determination about whether the word “sue”
could really mean “arbitrate” and light-heartedly suggested that
“perhaps the question [was], as Alice put it: ‘whether you can make
words mean so many different things?’”4 Although two other circuits
had previously concluded that similar arbitration agreements did not
run afoul of the CROA,5 the Ninth Circuit nonetheless created a
circuit split by holding that the plain meaning of the CROA afforded
consumers the definitive right to adjudication of all CROA disputes
in a judicial forum.6 The court’s decision wrongly created a circuit
split because it misapplied relevant Supreme Court precedent;
specifically, it adopted an interpretive methodology that was
insufficiently hospitable towards arbitration agreements.
This Note begins by summarizing the relevant facts and
procedural history of Greenwood. Next, the Note provides a brief
background for the key federal statute governing agreements to
arbitrate, the Federal Arbitration Act, and then discusses some of the
crucial Supreme Court precedent regarding statutory challenges to
arbitration agreements. The Note then presents a brief discussion of
the other circuit court decisions from which the Ninth Circuit split
1. 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679–1679j (2006).
3. Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1205 (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE, in THE ANNOTATED ALICE: THE DEFINITIVE
EDITION 213 (Martin Gardner ed., Norton Publishers 2000)).
4. Id.
5. Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2009); Gay v.
CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007).
6. Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1213.
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in its interpretation of the CROA in Greenwood. Finally, the Note
provides a detailed discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
Greenwood before concluding with an analysis of how the Greenwood
decision erred by interpreting the CROA in a way that was too
inhospitable to arbitration agreements.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
CompuCredit Corporation was a business that used direct mail
solicitation to market credit cards allegedly designed to help
individuals repair their credit.7 These cards had an initial credit limit
of just $300. Although no deposit was required for card
membership, the “subprime” cards actually carried first-year fees of
$257.8 These fees were disclosed in card promotional materials, but
these disclosures were buried within small print.9
The promotional materials for the card also included a “PreApproved Acceptance Certificate” that stated, among other things,
that by signing the certificate consumers represented that they had
both read and accepted the “Terms of the Offer.”10 One of the
provisions of the “Terms of the Offer” stated the following:
“Important—The agreement you receive contains a binding
arbitration provision. If a dispute is resolved by binding arbitration,
you will not have the right to go to court or have the dispute heard
by a jury, [or] to engage in pre-arbitration discovery . . . .”11
The plaintiffs in Greenwood were consumers of CompuCredit
credit cards.12 The plaintiffs brought suit, alleging that
CompuCredit’s failure to provide adequate fee disclosures had
violated both the CROA and California state law.13 CompuCredit
moved to compel arbitration, seeking to enforce the arbitration
agreements contained in the “Terms of the Offer.”14 The district
court declined to uphold the arbitration agreement contained in the
“Terms of the Offer” and held that the CROA precluded such

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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agreements.15 CompuCredit appealed the district court’s denial of its
motion to compel arbitration.16
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
After briefly explaining the impact of the Federal Arbitration Act
on arbitration jurisprudence, this section surveys the relevant
Supreme Court precedent regarding statutory challenges to
arbitration agreements. Finally, this section concludes by briefly
examining the decisions from which Greenwood split by holding that
the CROA precludes arbitration.
A. Federal Arbitration Act—Abandonment of Common Law
Arbitration Animosity
Historically, courts disfavored arbitration. However, a departure
from judicial animosity towards arbitration17 commenced with the
1925 passage of the predecessor to the modern Federal Arbitration
Act (“FAA”).18 The Supreme Court’s numerous decisions
interpreting the FAA19 have now made it clear that the Court
understands that the FAA manifested a clear congressional intent to
overcome “the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been
adopted by American courts.”20
B. Federal Arbitration Act—Articulation with Other Statutes
Despite its modern acknowledgement that the FAA was designed
to overcome judicial hostility towards agreements to arbitrate, in the
early years following the FAA’s passage the Supreme Court
continued to exhibit some hostility towards arbitration agreements in

15. Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 617 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2009),
aff’d, 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010).
16. Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1206.
17. See Kenneth F. Dunham, Southland Corp. v. Keating Revisited: Twenty-Five Years in
Which Direction?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 331, 333–35 (2010) (tracing the historical judicial
animosity toward agreements to arbitrate).
18. See id. at 342 (containing a discussion of the genesis of the Federal Arbitration Act).
19. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 414 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court has
promulgated over forty rulings on arbitration).
20. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
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statutory claims cases.21 The seminal 1985 case of Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.22 marked the turning point
away from such historic hostility. The case involved a Sherman
Antitrust Act claim arising out of a contract dispute between
international parties whose contract had contained an arbitration
agreement.23 Though one party argued that agreements to arbitrate
should be presumptively invalid in the context of statutory claims,
the Court disagreed and stated that there was “no warrant in the
Arbitration Act for implying in every contract within its ken a
presumption against arbitration of statutory claims.”24
Rather, the Court explained, “questions of arbitrability,” even
those involving statutory claims, were now to “be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration,” meaning
that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues [were to]
be resolved in favor of arbitration.”25 This treatment was warranted
because the Court was no longer suspicious as to the “desirability of
arbitration” or the “competence of arbitral tribunals,” and it also
recognized that a party arbitrating a statutory claim “does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by” a statute.26 While noting that
some statutory claims were not suitable for arbitration, the Court
stated that the process of statutory interpretation did not need to be
“distort[ed] . . . to ferret out the inappropriate,” because Congress
had, through the FAA, declared a general policy favoring
arbitration.27 Rather, if Congress intended that certain claims not be
arbitrable, “that intention [would] be deducible from text or
legislative history.”28
The 1987 decision of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon (which involved claims under Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations Act and Securities Exchange Act of 1934)

21. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 (1953) (holding that the Securities Act
of 1933 precluded arbitration of claims under the Securities Act and reasoning that “the
protective provisions of the Securities Act require[d] the effectiveness of judicial discretion to
fairly assure their effectiveness”).
22. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
23. Id. at 619–20.
24. Id. at 625.
25. Id. at 626 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)).
26. Id. at 626–28.
27. Id. at 627.
28. Id. at 628.
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expanded Mitsubishi by clarifying that its holding was not confined
to international disputes and by placing the burden of proof on
parties opposing arbitration to “show that Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue.”29 Though the Act specifically stated that the “district courts
of the United States” would have “exclusive jurisdiction” over
“violations of this title” and contained a waiver provision, the Court
still construed the Act in a way that permitted arbitration.30 Only
two years later, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc. (which involved a Securities Act of 1933 claim), the Court
reiterated its current “strong endorsement of the federal statutes”
favoring arbitration.31 Finally, the later Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp. (which involved an Age Discrimination in Employment
Act claim) instructed that there needed to be a “healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration” during the entire process of
statutory interpretation.32
C. Judicial Decisions Regarding the Arbitrability of Credit Repair
Organizations Act Claims
Though the Supreme Court has never entertained a claim
asserting that the CROA precludes arbitration agreements, two other
circuits entertained such claims prior to the Ninth Circuit’s
Greenwood opinion.33
In the Third Circuit case of Gay v. CreditInform, a consumer
brought CROA claims against the provider of credit repair services;
the contract between the consumer and provider contained an
arbitration agreement.34 The court concluded that the enforceability
of the arbitration agreement was not precluded by the CROA.35 The
court noted that because the case implicated the policy favoring
arbitration embodied in the FAA, relevant Supreme Court precedent
required the court to keep “in mind” the strong “federal policy

29. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225–27 (1987).
30. Id. at 227–28.
31. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
32. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
33. Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2009); Gay v.
CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007).
34. Gay, 511 F.3d at 374–75.
35. Id. at 375.
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favoring arbitration” throughout its process of examining the
CROA.36
With the policy in favor of arbitration in mind, the court
addressed the consumer’s principal claim as to why the CROA
precluded arbitration—that the CROA’s language stating “you have
a right to sue a credit repair organization” provided the right to
judicial adjudication. The court concluded that this language did not
actually entitle consumers to resolution of claims in a judicial forum
because the statutory language did not specifically identify a forum.37
The court signaled its willingness to accommodate the strong federal
policy favoring arbitration by noting that, even if this provision of
the CROA did refer to a judicial forum, the parties would still be
able to contract around this forum requirement, since the CROA’s
anti-waiver provision was quite narrow. The narrow anti-waiver
provision, according to the court, only precluded waiver of “rights
premised on the imposition of statutory duties.”38
The other circuit court opinion interpreting the CROA, Picard
v. Credit Solutions, Inc., involved a factual situation similar to the
one in Gay, and the court essentially adopted the reasoning of the
Gay court.39 Consequently, no discussion of Picard is entertained
here.
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
The Ninth Circuit’s 2–1 decision in Greenwood concluded that
the CROA precludes the enforceability of arbitration agreements.40
The court began its analysis by explaining the interpretive
methodology it planned to utilize in interpreting the CROA and
then used that interpretive methodology.41 Only after reaching its
conclusion that the CROA precludes agreements to arbitrate did the
court address each of the contentions of CompuCredit, the party
seeking arbitration.42 Finally, more than seven pages into its opinion,
the court noted that its opinion ran counter to the decisions of two
36. Id. at 378–79 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
37. Id. at 381–82.
38. Id. at 385.
39. Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009) (“This
Court agrees with Gay.”).
40. Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2010).
41. Id. at 1207.
42. Id. at 1209.
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other circuit courts; the court then attempted to distinguish these
cases and the line of Supreme Court precedent they had relied
upon.43 A spirited dissent followed.
A. Interpretive Methodology Defined—Standard Statutory
Interpretation Methodology Deployed
The court’s opinion began by presenting the plaintiff’s principal
claim that the CROA precludes the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.44 The court explained that it viewed its task as a
standard exercise of statutory interpretation; under this method, the
plain meaning of a statute controls, and recourse to legislative history
only occurs where the plain meaning is ambiguous.45 While the court
noted the federal policy favoring arbitration, the court placed equal
or greater emphasis on Congress’s ability to overcome this policy by
contrary command; the court then stated it would keep “these
principles in mind” as it interpreted the CROA.46
After introducing its interpretive methodology, the court began
its interpretive analysis of the CROA by explaining that the CROA
provides consumers with four rights.47 The only one of these rights
relevant to the court’s decision was the right to sue a credit repair
organization for violating the CROA.48 The court reasoned that
because consumers were provided with the right to “sue,” this
created the right to litigate disputes in a judicial forum.49 The court
explained that it was merely giving the word “sue” its plain meaning
and cited to several linguistic resources.50 After concluding that the
word “sue” entitled consumers to adjudication in a judicial forum,
the court then went on to explain that this right was absolute
because the CROA also contained an anti-waiver provision in
“unusually comprehensive and precise language” that provided:
“Any waiver by any consumer of any protection provided by or any
right of the consumer under this subchapter shall be treated as void;
and may not be enforced by any federal or state court or any other
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1205.
Id. at 1207.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1208.
Id.
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person.”51 Then, based upon only its roughly one page of reasoning,
the court concluded that the CROA precludes the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.52
B. Post-conclusion Discarding of CompuCredit’s Arguments
The court only concentrated on CompuCredit’s arguments after
concluding that the CROA precludes arbitration.53 The court began
by addressing CompuCredit’s arguments regarding the meaning of
the phrase “right to sue.”54 The court first tackled CompuCredit’s
argument that, because the “right to sue” language was placed
within the CROA’s disclosures section, it did not create substantive
rights.55 The court dismissed this contention, concluding that it
would have been irrational for Congress to require credit repair
providers to provide consumers with the right to “sue,” which the
court had previously decided provided the right to a judicial forum,
only to then immediately take away this same right.56 Next, the court
addressed the argument that the language “right to sue” was merely
shorthand for the right to bring a claim under another section of the
CROA that did not preclude arbitration.57 The also court dismissed
this argument, concluding that it would render superfluous a part of
the statute.58 Finally, the court addressed the argument that the
“right to sue” language was merely simplified language meant to
prevent consumer confusion, stating that this argument was
nonsensical because it would actually create confusion if the word
“sue” did not provide the right to judicial adjudication.59
After addressing CompuCredit’s arguments regarding the
meaning of the CROA’s “right to sue” language, the court then
went on to address CompuCredit’s argument regarding the impact
of the CROA’s waiver provision.60 CompuCredit argued that,
because the waiver provision said that it could “not be enforced by

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

74

Id. (numbering omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a) (2010)).
Id. at 1209.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1209–10.
Id. at 1210.
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any Federal or State court or any other person,” the reference to
“any other person” meant that Congress had anticipated that CROA
claims would be arbitrated.61 The court, however, concluded that the
statutory language did not lead to “such a clear and unilateral
conclusion” because the language might actually refer to other types
of arbitration proceedings, such as collection proceedings.62 The
Court further noted that the CROA repeatedly referred to courts as
an enforcement mechanism.63 The Court also sought to bolster the
strength of its reasoning by noting that its decision was in harmony
with “other courts,” but it then cited only a single court decision
from the Northern District of Texas.64
C. Circuit Split Without Fanfare Late in the Game
The Greenwood court was more than seven pages into its opinion
before it first noted that its holding was contrary to the holdings of
the Third Circuit in Gay v. CreditInform and the Eleventh Circuit in
Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc.65 The court justified its departure
from its sister circuits by stating that they had given “surprisingly
little regard to the ‘right to sue’ language” and had wrongly
“rel[ied] upon reasoning in Supreme Court cases . . . distinguishable
from the situation here.”66 The court criticized the Third Circuit’s
Gay opinion for “ignor[ing] the plain meaning of the word ‘sue’”
and for concluding that, even if the “right to sue” provided the right
to a judicial adjudication, this right could still be waived.67 Next, the
Greenwood court noted that it found the Gay court’s reliance “upon
analogies to several Supreme Court arbitration cases . . . unavailing”;
it then factually distinguished a number of the core Supreme Court
precedents regarding the arbitrability of statutory claims that the Gay
court had relied upon, including McMahon, Mitsubishi, and Gilmer.68

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1211.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1212; see also Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 378–79 (3d Cir. 2007).
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D. Dissent—Alternate Methodology of Statutory Interpretation
A spirited dissent followed the majority opinion. Unlike the
majority opinion, the dissent began by noting the importance of the
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.”69 Only after addressing
the strong policy favoring arbitration did the dissent proceed to
address the “right to sue” language of the CROA, concluding that
this language was not “intended to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies.”70 The dissent noted that each of the rights provided in
the disclosure section of the statute was actually provided for
elsewhere; therefore, the dissent concluded, the disclosure section
was not intended to create any “substantive rights.”71 The dissent
further noted that the “right to sue” did not, in and of itself,
“mandate a judicial forum,” and that the broad waiver provision
relied on by the majority actually contemplated adjudications in
other fora because it stated that waivers of statutory rights could
“not be enforced by any Federal or State court or any other person.”72
The dissent went on to further suggest that mere references to courts
in the CROA were insufficient to “overcome the ‘liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements.’”73 Finally, the dissent noted
that because the Ninth Circuit has a strong policy against creating
circuit splits, the court should not have “lightly create[d] a circuit
split on an issue of national application on the basis of . . . flimsy
evidence.”74
V. ANALYSIS
In concluding that the statutory language of the CROA clearly
precludes the enforceability of arbitration agreements, the Ninth
Circuit failed to properly apply the strong federal policy favoring the
enforceability of arbitration agreements and wrongly created a circuit
split. By pretending that federal arbitration jurisprudence required it
to adopt a hostile approach toward arbitration agreements, the Ninth
Circuit misapplied Supreme Court arbitration agreement precedent,

69. Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1214 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1215.
72. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a) (2010)).
73. Id. at 1216 (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24).
74. Id.
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which clearly establishes that arbitration agreements should be
welcomed as presumptively valid.75 The court’s decision will generate
confusion for Ninth Circuit courts.
This section commences by examining the differences in
interpretive methodologies that produced the inconsistent outcomes
in the Greenwood and Gay/Picard opinions. Next, it examines the
likely substantive impact of the deployment of these distinct
interpretive methodologies upon the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. Then, it explains why the interpretive methodology
employed by the Greenwood court is out of sync with relevant
Supreme Court precedent. Finally, it concludes by predicting the
likely future ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s recent Greenwood
opinion.
A. Interpretive Methodologies Examined
Though the Greenwood majority opinion and the Gay and Picard
opinions each faced the same task of interpreting the CROA, the
Greenwood decision reached a fundamentally different conclusion
than the Gay and Picard opinions.76 What produced these disparate
conclusions? The answer is that they approached the task of
interpreting the CROA using fundamentally different interpretive
methodologies. Underlying these methodologies were distinct
conceptualizations of the proper interplay between the strong federal
policy in favor of arbitration and statutory language encapsulated in a
wide variety of federal statutes.
The Greenwood majority viewed its task as a standard exercise of
statutory interpretation.77 The court stated that it would apply its
“usual methodology in statutory construction” and, following this
methodology, quickly concluded that the “plain meaning” of the
CROA should control through a simple, two-step deductive
process.78 While the Ninth Circuit noted the existence of the federal
75. See supra text accompanying notes 21–32.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 38–39, 48.
77. Greenwood, 615 F.3d at 1207.
78. See id. First, the court examined the language in the statute stating that consumers
have a right to “sue” and used various linguistic resources, such as dictionaries, to show that
“sue” cannot mean arbitrate. Id. Second, the court examined the waiver provision of the
CROA and determined that this provision is very broad and, therefore, covers the right to sue.
Id. Then, applying these two subsidiary conclusions in concert, the court concluded that,
because the statute provides the right to sue (which the court construed to mean in a judicial
forum), and also provides, through a broad waiver provision, that this right cannot be waived,
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policy favoring arbitration, the court immediately noted that this
policy could be overridden and placed strong emphasis on this fact.79
Based upon its recognition that the policy could be overridden, and
before applying the federal policy favoring the enforcement of
arbitration agreements, the court, as a threshold matter, scoured the
CROA for clues suggesting that Congress had attempted to
statutorily override the general policy favoring arbitration.80
Therefore, the first step under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretive
methodology involves a probing exercise in statutory interpretation
to look for clues suggesting that Congress has chosen to override the
general policy favoring arbitration in relation to a specific statutory
regime. At this initial stage of inquiry, the strong policy favoring
arbitration plays no functional role in a court’s analysis. Only when
clues suggesting that Congress has given a more specific command
do not appear within a statute does the general policy in favor of
arbitration then enter into play as a presumptive, gap-filling default
rule. Thus, under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretive methodology,
though arbitration is the presumptive default rule, the rule’s practical
effect is circumscribed; the rule is only rendered functionally
operative where, after threshold-level judicial scrutiny of the specific
statute at issue, a court can find no evidence suggesting that
Congress preempted the presumptive default rule with a more
specific, contrary mandate.
On the other hand, the courts in Gay and Picard viewed their
tasks in a way that gave broader importance to the federal policy
favoring the enforceability of arbitration agreements.81 While, like
the Greenwood court, the Gay court noted that Congress was free to
override the policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements by
contrary command, early on in its opinion the Gay court clearly
emphasized that the case “implicate[d] the Federal Arbitration Act”
and further noted that the FAA was designed to overcome
“longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”82 More
significantly, the court noted critical language from the Gilmer
opinion suggesting that the policy in favor of arbitration should play
Congress must have intended to preclude the arbitrability of CROA disputes. Id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2009); Gay v.
CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 378 (3d Cir. 2007).
82. See Gay, 511 F.3d at 378.
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a role throughout a court’s process of interpretive analysis.83
Therefore, under the Gay/Picard interpretive methodology, because
the general rule favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements
operates as a background principle from the earliest stages of
statutory interpretation, it functionally operates as a canonical rule
that resolves any statutory ambiguity in favor of the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate.
B. Substantive Ramifications of Distinct Interpretive Methodologies
The distinct functional roles of the presumption favoring the
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate under the two interpretive
methodologies highlighted in the previous subsection are likely to
create important, substantive differences in interpretive outcomes.
First and foremost, under the Greenwood methodology, it is clear
that agreements to arbitrate will be upheld less frequently than under
the Gay/Picard methodology. This is because, under Greenwood’s
methodology, before the presumption favoring arbitration comes
into play the court must use general statutory interpretive techniques
to interpret the statute, probing carefully for some sort of specific
statutory intention that overrides the general presumption. On the
other hand, under the Gay/Picard methodology, unless a statutory
scheme is very clear in stating that arbitration is not permitted, close
questions will be resolved in favor of arbitration at the interpretive
stage. Thus, under the Gay/Picard methodology the policy favoring
arbitration plays a role earlier in the process of statutory inquiry and
is more hospitable to arbitration.
An additional difference between the two methodologies is that,
under the Greenwood methodology, courts that do not favor
arbitration will more easily be able to find ways to avoid enforcing
agreements to arbitrate at the interpretive stage when the
presumption in favor of arbitration is inoperable. Conversely, under
the Gay/Picard interpretive method, even judges that disfavor
agreements to arbitrate will have a difficult time invalidating such
agreements, because this methodology requires that ambiguities in
specific statutes be resolved in favor of arbitration. Consequently,

83. See id. at 379 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26
(1991)) (“Throughout such an inquiry, it should be kept in mind that questions of
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration.”).

79

DO NOT DELETE

4/5/2011 7:46 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2011

based upon the aforementioned substantive differences, it is clear
that under Greenwood’s methodology, arbitration agreements are
relatively disfavored as compared to under the Gay/Picard
interpretive methodology.
C. Greenwood—Infidelity to Supreme Court Precedent
The Greenwood case’s interpretive methodology, which is
relatively inhospitable to arbitration agreements, is out of sync with
relevant Supreme Court precedent because this precedent suggests
that the federal policy favoring arbitration should play a role
throughout the process of statutory interpretation84—and, similarly,
that the policy should resolve ambiguity in favor of arbitration.85 The
Greenwood opinion failed to even note these critical components of
relevant Supreme Court precedent. The court’s failure to note these
critical components led the court to believe that it was justified in
distinguishing relevant Supreme Court precedent based merely upon
factual distinctions. The Greenwood majority thereby failed to
recognize that embodied within the precedent it distinguished was a
portable interpretive methodology that the Supreme Court has
nimbly employed across a variety of statutory regimes in creating a
presumptive rule that is highly hospitable to arbitration.86 The
Greenwood majority overlooked the fact that what relevant Supreme
Court precedent now essentially requires is that, if a statute has a
plausible construction that permits the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate, these agreements are to be upheld.87 A clear, unequivocal,
contrary command from Congress in a specific statutory regime is
required to override this general presumption favoring arbitration.88
D. Greenwood—Legacy Going Forward
Because Greenwood misapplied Supreme Court precedent, its
decision will create substantial confusion for courts within the Ninth
Circuit. Various other statutory regimes likely contain provisions that

84. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
85. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983)).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 21–32.
87. See id.
88. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
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could be construed to provide individuals or businesses with the
right to a judicial adjudication of a controversy. In light of
Greenwood, courts will face difficulty knowing when they should
enforce other agreements to arbitrate. Under Greenwood, agreements
to arbitrate involving statutory claims are no longer presumptively
valid at the statutory interpretation stage because the Greenwood
interpretive methodology does not apply the presumption in favor of
arbitrability until late in the statutory interpretive process. On the
other hand, under Supreme Court precedent, these agreements to
arbitrate are very clearly presumptively valid at the interpretive stage.
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to clarify the presumptive
validity of such agreements.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s Greenwood decision misapplied Supreme
Court arbitration agreement precedent by applying a statutory
interpretation methodology that treated agreements to arbitrate
inhospitably instead of properly regarding them as presumptively
valid. The Federal Arbitration Act, in connection with relevant
Supreme Court precedent interpreting it, creates a legal regime that
is highly hospitable to the enforcement of arbitration agreements. In
cases involving statutory challenges to arbitration agreements, this
legal regime requires courts to apply the policy favoring arbitration
as they interpret statutes. Where a given statute has any permissible
construction that will allow for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, that construction must be adopted. Congress must
speak clearly to override this strong presumption favoring the
enforceability of arbitration awards. The Ninth Circuit split from its
sister circuits in Greenwood because it did not apply the strong
presumption in favor of the enforceability of arbitration agreements
as it interpreted the CROA. By applying the appropriate interpretive
methodology, the Ninth Circuit would have concluded that the
arbitration agreement was valid, thereby avoiding the creation of a
circuit split.
Michael Q. Cannon

 J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University.
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